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Improving California's Quiet Title Laws
By MICHAEL A. WILLEMSEN*
THE removal of a defect in title is often an unfortunate prerequisite
to the sale or development of property. Various and assorted remedies
existed at common law and in equity that depending on the particular
facts of the case, could be used to clear title.' These remedies, however,
have been largely supplanted by the statutory action to quiet title.
2
California, for reasons unclear to me, provides two alternative quiet title
remedies. An action to quiet title against the specific claim of a known
claimant must be brought under California Code of Civil Procedure
section 738.1 This section does not operate in rem, and as a result has
little advantage over the traditional remedies,4 and probably none over
a modem action for declaratory relief.5 The usefulness of a section 738
action is that for little additional expense, it can be combined with an
action in rem under Code of Civil Procedure sections 749 or 749.1,6
* A.B., M.A., 1959, LL.B., 1962, Stanford University; Member, California Bar.
1. The principal remedy at common law was the action of ejectment, which,
however, was not available to a plaintiff in undisturbed possession. Comment, En-
hancing the Marketability of Land: The Suit to Quiet Title, 68 YALE L.J. 1245, 1266
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Quiet Title]. Equity offered the bill to remove a cloud
on title, the bill of peace, and the bill quia timet. Finnegan, Problems and Procedures
in Quiet Title Actions, 26 NEB. L. REv. 485, 486-88 (1947); 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 608,
609 (1965); 68 YALE LJ. 1266-67 (1959). These equitable procedures were not
available to a plaintiff out of possession, presumably because ejectment was an ade-
quate remedy at law.
2. For a review of the quiet title legislation of other states, see Quiet Title,
supra note 1, at 1245.
3. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 738 provides: "An action may be brought by any
person against another who claims an estate or interest in real or personal property,
adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim .... "
4. It does, however, avoid the equity requirement that the plaintiff be in posses-
sion of the land. Thomson v. Thomson, 7 Cal. 2d 671, 676, 62 P.2d 358, 360 (1936).
5. Cf. Ephraim v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 28 Cal. 2d 824, 172 P.2d 501 (1946).
6. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 749 provides: "An action may be brought, either as
a separate action, or joined with an action under Section 738 of this code, to determine
the adverse claims to and clouds upon title to real property by a person who, by
himself or by himself and his predecessors in interest, has been in the actual, exclusive
and adverse possession of such property continuously for 20 years prior to the filing
[835]
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thus obtaining a combined decree that quiets title against all persons,
known and unknown, and against all defects.7
of the complaint, claiming to own the same in fee against the whole world, and who,
by himself or by himself and his predecessors in interest, has paid all taxes of every
kind levied or assessed against the property and which were payable during the period
of five years continuously next preceding the filing of the complaint. Said action
shall be commenced by the filing of a verified complaint averring the matters above
set forth.
"Defendants. The said complaint may include as defendants in such action, in addi-
tion to such persons as appear of record to have, all other persons who are known to
the plaintiff to have, some claim or cloud on the real property described in the com-
plaint adverse to plaintiff's ownership, and other persons unknown claiming any right,
title, estate, interest or lien in such real property, or cloud upon the title of plaintiff
thereto, and the plaintiff may describe such unknown defendants in the complaint as
follows: 'also all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate, lien or
interest in the real property described in the complaint adverse to plaintiff's ownership,
or any cloud upon plaintiff's title thereto.'
"Unknown claimants. If the person or all persons having a claim or cloud on the
title to said real property are unknown to plaintiff, the latter may describe them in
the complaint as 'all persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate, lien or interest
in the real property described in the complaint adverse to plaintiff's ownership, or any
cloud upon plaintiff's title thereto.'
"Defendant claiming through plaintiff. If any known defendant named in the com-
plaint is a person claiming any right, title, estate, lien or interest in and to the real
property under the plaintiff or any predecessor in interest of the plaintiff, which claim
has arisen, or has been created by the plaintiff or any predecessor in interest of the
plaintiff, within 20 years prior to the filing of the complaint, then as to any such
defendant the complaint shall contain allegations appropriate to an action under
Section 738 of this code, and as to any such defendant the action shall be deemed and
considered brought under the provisions of Section 738 and sections pertinent thereto
of this code, and as to any such defendant the proceedings in the action shall be gov-
erned by the provisions of said Section 738 and said sections pertinent thereto; and the
provisions of Section 750 of this code shall not apply to the proceedings as to any such
defendant.
"Lis Pendens. Within 10 days after the filing of the complaint, plaintiff shall file,
or cause to be filed, in the office of the county recorder of the county where the
property is situated, a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the matters
required by Section 409 of this code."
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 749.1 provides for a quiet title action based upon 10
years adverse possession and payment of taxes. The action is deemed brought under
section 738 as to defendants claiming through plaintiff whose claims arise within 10
years of the filing date. In all other respects section 749.1 is identical to section 749.
7. A judgment under section 749 or section 749.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
operates in rem. See Taliaferro v. Riddle, 166 Cal. App. 2d 124, 128, 332 P.2d 803,
806 (1958) (by implication). Consequently it is effective against all defects to title.
It serves, in effect, as a new starting point for future title search. A judgment under
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 738 is not binding upon unknown claimants. In particular,
it is not effective to bar unborn claimants unless a guardian ad litem has been
appointed. Comment, California Procedures for Obtaining Judicial Decrees Binding
on Unborn or Unascertained Persons, 5 HASTINGs L.J. 199, 201-03 (1954).
For further discussion of the advantages of an in rem action, see Quiet Title,
supra note 1, at 1280-86; 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 608 (1965).
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The portion of the action against unknown claimants, according to
the terms of sections 749 and 749.1, must be based on adverse posses-
sion. As a practical matter, it may be necessary to ground the action
on adverse possession even though the plaintiff has good title. To es-
tablish adverse possession, the plaintiff must prove that he and his
predecessors have held possession and paid all taxes assessed for the
statutory period. Whatever problems this presents may appear trivial
compared to the immense difficulties of proving good title, which for
example, might require proving the terms of an-unrecorded and subse-
quently lost deed, or that an 1880 survey was in error, or that an 1892
deed incorrectly expressed the parties' intention. In addition, the plain-
tiff must often start with the knowledge that all parties to the convey-
ances in question, and all witnesses to their execution and delivery, are
long since dead. Adverse possession, thus, is often turned to as the
most practical remedy for a true owner seeking to render his title mar-
ketable."
This article will propose certain statutory changes with the object
of facilitating the in rem action to quiet title in California and of ex-
panding the variety of situations in which that action is effective to
clear title defects. The proposed changes are as follows:
(1) To permit an in rem quiet title action based upon five years
adverse possession and payment of taxes, thus bringing the limitation
periods of sections 749 and 749.1 into conformity with the statute of
limitations pertaining to the recovery of real property.9
(2) To facilitate the bringing of a quiet title action where the
claimant of record is deceased, and his estate is not and has not been
subject to administration (or the administration has lapsed or termi-
nated without a decree distributing the subject property), by (a) per-
mitting an action and decree against "the heirs and devisees" of the
decedent as a class; and (b) authorizing the appointment of an admin-
istrator ad litem"' with rights and duties specifically tailored for, and
8. Facilitating proof of good title is one of the reasons for legal recognition of
title by adverse possession. "The [adverse possession] statute has not for its object
to reward the diligent trespasser for his wrong nor yet to penalize the negligent and
dormant owner for sleeping upon his rights; the great purpose is automatically to
quiet all titles which are openly and consistently asserted, to provide proof of meri-
torious titles, and correct errors in conveyancing." Ballantine, Title by Adverse
Possession, 32 HARv. L. REv. 135 (1918) [hereinafter cited as Ballantine]; see P.
BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLEs 107-08 (1953); Quiet Title, supra note 1, at 1277.
9. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 318 provides that "the plaintiff, his ancestor,
predecessor, or grantor, (must have been] seized or possessed of the property in
question, within five years before the commencement of the action."
10. See text accompanying note 65 infra.
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limited to, the defense of the quiet title action.
(3) To permit an in rem quiet title action based upon record
title from a date antecedent to all claims at issue.
(4) To permit the cancellation, in a quiet title action brought by
the surface owner, of any severed mineral interest that has not been
exploited for 20 years or more preceding the bringing of the action, and
whose exploitation is not economically feasible.
In Rem Action Based Upon Five Years Adverse
Possession and Payment of Taxes
The statutes creating the in rem quiet title actions-sections 749
and 749.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure-require, respectively, 20
years adverse possession with five years of tax payments, or 10 years
of tax payments. California Civil Code section 1007, however, states
that "[o]ccupancy for the period prescribed by the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure as sufficient to bar any action for the recovery of the property
confers a title thereto, denominated a title by prescription, which is suf-
ficient against all. . . ." The "period prescribed by the Code of Civil
Procedure" is plainly not the 10 or 20 year occupations of the in rem
statutes, which were not in existence when section 1007 was enacted,'
but the five year statute of limitations on an action of ejectment con-
tained in Code of Civil Procedure section 318.12 And in contrast to the
in rem quiet title sections, but in harmony with sections 318 and 1007,
the in personam action to quiet title'3 requires only five years adverse
possession with payment of taxes.
14
The result of the inconsistencies outlined above is that an adverse
possessor, after completing five years possession with payment of taxes,
enters a state of limbo. Although Civil Code section 1007, if it means
what it plainly says, gives the adverse possessor good title, the adverse
possessor does not have record title, and until he completes five to fif-
teen more years of possession, he cannot bring an in rem action to ac-
quire record title. If his problem is some specific adverse claim asserted
by a known claimant, an action and decree in personam may satisfy
the title insurance company or whomever the plaintiff needs to satisfy.
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 dates from 1872. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 749
was enacted in 1901, Cal. Stats. 1901, ch. 183, § 1, at 579. Section 749.1 was added
in 1949, Cal. Stats. 1949, ch. 1025, § 1, at 1886.
12. Bashore v. Mooney, 4 Cal. App. 276, 281, 87 P. 553, 555-56 (1906); see
note 9 supra.
13. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 738.
14. Mings v. Compton City School Dist., 129 Cal. App. 413, 418, 18 P.2d 967,
969 (1933).
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In such a case, the plaintiff merely foregoes the bonus of extra protec-
tion against claims by unknown claimants. If, however, the cloud on
the title is one in which unknown claimants may have an interest, then
the adverse possessor is locked into the property. For at least five years
he cannot sell or develop the land, and is likely to have difficulty bor-
rowing against it.
This problem may confront the new owner who has acquired pos-
session by gift, inheritance, or intrafamily conveyance-or title without
title insurance. To obtain an in rem quiet title decree after he has held
possession and paid taxes for five years, he must still prove the adverse
possession and tax payments of his predecessors. Proof of possession
is a matter of availability of witnesses and, for land not completely
utilized, of proving compliance with Code of Civil Procedure sections
323 and 325.1' Proof of tax payments may be even more difficult.
Although the county records will show that taxes were assessed, to
whom assessed, and the fact of payment, they may not show who actu-
ally paid the taxes. Furthermore, there appears in the cases no pre-
sumption or inference that payment of taxes was by the person to whom
the tax was assessed. To the contrary, the cases state categorically
that adverse possession cannot be proved by inference, but that each
essential element must be proved by convincing evidence. 6 If plain-
tiffs predecessor saved his tax receipts and they are available to the
plaintiff, there is adequate proof; if not, it may be impossible to find
anyone with personal knowledge of the facts. A sympathetic judge,
15. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 323 provides: "For the purpose of constituting
an adverse possession by any person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument,
or a judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in
the following cases:
"1. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved;
"2. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure;
"3. Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel, or of
fencing timber for the purposes of husbandry, or for pasturage, or for the ordinary
use of the occupant;
"4. Where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the portion of such
farm or lot that may have been left not cleared, or not inclosed according to the
usual course and custom of the adjoining country, shall be deemed to have been
occupied for the same length of time as the part improved and cultivated."
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 325 provides, in part: "For the purpose of constituting an
adverse possession by a person claiming title, not founded upon a written instrument,
judgment, or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the
following cases only:
"First-Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
"Second-Where it has been usually cultivated or improved."
16. Weller v. Chavarria, 233 Cal. App. 2d 234, 242, 43 Cal. Rptr. 364, 370
(1965); cf. Hart v. All Persons, 26 Cal. App. 664, 673, 148 P. 236, 240-41 (1915).
a well-coached witness, and carefully framed leading questions may
solve the problem. Otherwise, the plaintiff may have to wait another
five years before selling, developing, or encumbering the land.1
7
The obvious solution to this problem is legislation permitting an
in rem quiet title action after five years adverse possession and tax pay-
ments. Yet when a solution is this obvious, a second look is in order
to see what reasons might justify the asymmetry of the statutes. Hos-
tility toward adverse possessors and solicitude for true owners may ex-
plain the matter.'8 This emotional response, however, overlooks the
logic of the situation. With a few exceptions, which will be discussed
shortly, five years adverse possession will as effectively bar the previous
owner as would 10 or 20 years. Under the present law, the "true
owner," after his land has been adversely possessed for five years, is
left with a paper title he can neither sell nor enforce in possession.
What he can do, and all he can do, is compel the possessor to pay him
a fraction of the land value for the privilege of selling or developing the
land five years earlier. My sympathies in this situation are with the
possessor; surely the statutory purpose was not to permit or encourage
such nuisance-value consolitums. 19
It has also been suggested that 10 or 20 years possession is more
likely to give the true owner notice than five years possession.2" But
if the owner does not discover the possession within five years, assuming
the possession was open and notorious, discovery later will do him
17. It does not seem at all likely that the appellate courts will reduce the strict
requirement of proof in quiet title actions. A problem of this character reaches
appellate courts only in a context of contested litigation, probably involving a conflict
of evidence whether tax payments were made by the adverse possessor or by the
claimant. In rejecting inferential proof in this type of contested action, the courts
reacted naturally and, I think, correctly, to the case at hand.
18. L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION
365 (1960), explains the California statutes as follows: "[T]he 5-year ordinary
period is regarded as too short to permit it to serve as the basis of a conclusive title
determination procedure in which service by publication is permitted. A more ortho-
dox limitations period is required. The provisions are typical of a good many existing
in various jurisdictions in which the equivalent of 'substantive limitations' is incorpo-
rated directly into the provisions made for quieting or determining titles. In other
words, limitations or limitation-like provisions are placed directly in the context in
which they usually become important-in a suit to establish, untangle, or promote
the marketability of titles." This argument might justify a longer limitation period
were it not for the fact that adverse possession is used primarily as a method of clearing
meritorious titles, not as a method of stealing land. It does not justify a statutory
inconsistency the effect of which is to render legally sound titles temporarily unmarket-
able.
19. See Ballantine, supra note 8, at 140.
20. 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 608, 611 (1965).
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little good; his right to recover possession is barred by the five year
limitation of section 318. If we simply want the owner to know he has
lost his land, service of the quiet title summons is much quicker than
continued unobserved possession.
When a claim is not yet barred by the five year limitation period,
an in rem action against the claimant involves a risk, in view of the lib-
eral notice and publication requirements, that the claimant may be un-
justly deprived of his interest. Can the present statutory inconsistency
be justified by those exceptional cases in which five years adverse pos-
session, with payment of taxes, do not bar the owner's claim? An ex-
amination of such cases shows that the statutes are not written with a
view toward protecting exceptional claimants. A claimant under a dis-
ability-infancy, imprisonment or the like, as specified in Code of Civil
Procedure section 32821 -may bring an action of ejectment to recover
possession long after the five year period has run. Section 328 spe-
cifies a maximum period of disability of 20 years, and since the claimant
would then have five years in which to bring suit, 25 years adverse
possession is needed to bar such claims.22 If protection of disabled
claimants is the statutory goal, however, the 20 year period of Code of
Civil Procedure section 749 is five years too short. Likewise, the 10
and 10 alternative of Code of Civil Procedure section 749.1 makes no
21. CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 328 provides: "If a person entitled to commence
an action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession
thereof, or to make any entry or defense founded on the title to real property, or to
rents or services out of the same, is, at the time such title first descends or accrues,
either:
"1. Under the age of majority;
"2. Insane;
"3. Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution upon conviction of a criminal
offense, for a term less than life;
"The time, not exceeding twenty years, during which such disability continues is
not deemed any portion of the time in this chapter limited for the commencement of
such action, or the making of such entry or defense, but such action may be com-
menced, or entry or defense made, within the period of five years after such dis-
ability shall cease, or after the death of the person entitled, who shall die under such
disability; but such action shall not be commenced, or entry or defense made, after
that period."
In addition to the disabilities specified in section 328, statutes of limitations are
tolled during active military service, or by fraudulent concealment of the cause of ac-
tion. See M. OGDEN, CA iFoRNu REAL PROPERTY LAw 839 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as OGDEN].
22. Under rare circumstances more than 25 years could be required. Periods
during which an action is stayed by injunction, or the claimant is on active military
service, are not counted toward the 20 year maximum disability period. CAL. CODE
Civ. PROC. §§ 354, 356. If the claimant died before the statute ran, his representative
would have six months after death in which to bring the action. Id. § 353.
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sense at all; five additional yearly tax payments have no effect on the
period of disability under section 328.
Another claimant whose claim may survive five years adverse pos-
session is the holder of a future interest. If, for example, a fee is divided
between a life tenant and remainderman, the statute of limitations will
not begin to run against the remainderman until the life tenant dies.23
The requirements of sections 749 and 749.1, however, bear no relation
to the protection of persons holding future interests. A rational quiet
title statute cannot serve this end; the possessor cannot be denied a quiet
title for the lifetime of all who might assert claims, plus 21 years. And,
depending in part on the constitutionality and interpretation of Civil
Code section 715.8, there may exist claims to future interests that could
not be barred by adverse possession for hundreds of years.24
It is possible that a claimant could avoid the five year limitation
by casting his action in a form other than that provided in section 318,
which is drawn in terms of a statute of limitations on the common law
action of ejectment. At one time, in the case of Brusie v. Gates,25 the
California Supreme Court stated that actions to quiet title were not sub-
ject to the limitations of section 318. The reasons given by the court,
in my opinion, derive from the court's implicit assumption that quiet
title actions are equitable in character,26 and thus immune from statutes
of limitations. Fortunately, subsequent court decisions have ignored
the Brusie dictum, and have established that a dispossessed owner can-
not quiet title after five years adverse possession is proved against him.2 7
Most other alternative forms of action have limitations of less than
five years. 28  An action for fraud, however, can be brought within
three years from discovery. 9  Section 338(4) of the Code of Civil
Procedure speaks of actions "for relief on the ground of fraud" without
specifying the nature of the relief; section 318 speaks of the remedy of
recovery of real property without discussing the right to this remedy.
On linguistic analysis, both should apply to an action to rescind a fraud-
ulent transfer of real property. The courts, however, assumed that a
23. Pryor v. Winter, 147 Cal. 554, 82 P. 202 (1905).
24. See text accompanying notes 101-06 inlra.
25. 80 Cal. 462, 465, 22 P. 284, 285 (1889) (dictum).
26. A quiet title action is equitable where there is no prayer for possession.
Thomson v. Thomson, 7 Cal. 2d 671, 681, 62 P.2d 358, 362 (1936); Title & Doc.
Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 309, 88 P. 356, 359 (1907); Dills v.
Delira Corp., 145 Cal. App. 2d 124, 130, 302 P.2d 397, 401 (1956).
27. Haney v. Kinevan, 73 Cal. App. 2d 343, 166 P.2d 361 (1946); see South
Tule Independent Ditch Co. v. King, 144 Cal. 450, 455, 77 P. 1032, 1034 (1904).
28. See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 335-49%/.
29. Id. § 338(4).
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choice between the two was necessary and, after a confusing array of
decisions, chose section 338(4). In Leeper v. Beltrami,30 this choice
barred a claimant who had brought his action within the five year pe-
riod of section 318, but had failed to give prompt notice of rescission.
The implication of Leeper, however, is that a defrauded claimant who
discovered the fraud more than five years later could still, with prompt
notice of rescission, successfully bring an action to recover possession.
Leeper thus creates a third class of claimants whose claims may survive
five years adverse possession; however, the present quiet title require-
ments find little more justification as a basis for protecting defrauded
vendors. Neither five, ten, nor twenty years adverse possession will
give secure title against a claimant fraudulently dispossessed but still
unaware of his cause of action. The more years that pass, the less the
likelihood that such undiscovered claims will be asserted; but, in all
probability, five years would be sufficient for the majority of these
claims. Again, the 10 year alternative of section 749.1, conditioned
upon five years additional tax payments, has no relevance to the protec-
tion of this class of claimant.
This review of the various claims-those of persons under disabil-
ity, holders of future interests, and defrauded vendors-that may sur-
vive five years adverse possession reveals no justification for the 10 or
20 year periods imposed by sections 749.1 and 749, respectively. Nei-
ther 10 nor 20 years is sufficient to bar with certainty any of these three
types of claims, while conditioning the 10 year period upon five addi-
tional tax payments makes no sense with respect to any of these claims.
Moreover, the procedural requirements of quiet title actions afford con-
siderable protection to such claims. Claimants of record cannot be
sued and served as "unknown persons," but must be named and served
specifically-this is the clear implication of the statutes 1 and is prob-
ably a constitutional requirement as well. 2 Thus, the danger that the
liberal notice requirements of an in rem action will lead to judgments
foreclosing still viable interests is obviated where the interest, and its
present owners, appear of record.3
I think it is fair to conclude that the claims protected by the 10
30. 53 Cal. 2d 195, 347 P.2d 12, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1959).
31. See text accompanying note 62 infra.
32. See text accompanying note 63 infra.
33. If the interest does not appear of record, it can be destroyed by sale to a
bona fide purchaser. See CAL. CIV. CODn § 1214. This, however, is not the case
where the interest is recorded but the owner of record is not the present owner.
Unrecorded interests, of course, do not generally cloud titles, but recorded interests
whose present owners are unknown are a common problem.
and 20 year requirements are trivial in number, that the protection
afforded is arbitrary and haphazard, and that the quiet title statutes can
be brought into alignment with the five year limitations of Civil Proce-
dure sections 318 and 325 without noticeable harm.
Quiet Title Action Where the Claimant Is Deceased
Frequently, the record owner of the claim clouding the title is long
since deceased. If his estate was probated, title to the claim may have
passed through decree of distribution to living persons who can be
named and served as defendants. If his estate was not probated, com-
plex practical and ethical problems arise.34
The problems created by the latter situation may be illustrated by
a hypothetical case. Suppose the plaintiff acquired land by inheritance
from his grandfather who received a deed and possession from one
Williams in 1902. Record title, however, is in Jones, who acquired it
from the federal patentee in 1880. While neighborhood legend is that
Williams bought the land from Jones, admissible evidence is lacking.
A search reveals that Jones died in 1907, that before death he put all
other real property (but not the land in question) into joint tenancy
with his wife, and that his estate was never probated. Mrs. Jones died
in 1911. Although her will did not specifically mention this property,
it did contain a clause that divided undiscovered property equally among
six children. On these facts, who should the plaintiff name and serve
as defendants? The law is clear that he cannot name Jones as sole de-
fendant and effect service by publication.35 This leaves two choices:
(1) locate and serve the heirs, or (2) procure appointment of an ad-
ministrator for Jones and serve the administrator.
Action Against "Heirs and Devisees" of Deceased Claimant
Title to realty, although subject to administration, passes directly
to the heirs;36 hence, bypassing administration by serving the heirs
seems justified. The problems here are practical ones. Our plaintiffs
search has identified the heirs as of 1911 but the cost of identifying,
locating and serving the present heirs may be prohibitive. Assuming
that service is made and that the plaintiff successfully receives judg-
ment, it will nevertheless not be a judgment against Jones by name.
34. The same problems arise in the rarer cases of estates whose administration
has lapsed without distribution, or whose decree of distribution failed to distribute
the property in question.
35. Jones v. Walker, 47 Cal. App. 2d 566, 118 P.2d 299 (1941).
36. CAL. PROB. CODE § 300.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
March 19701 IMPROVING CALIFORNIA'S QUIET TITLE LAWS 845
Since there will be nothing of record to show that the persons served
were in fact heirs, and the only heirs, of Jones, there will still be a gap
in the plaintiff's chain of title. The plaintiffs title policy will continue
to feature an exception for the interest if any, of any heirs of Jones
not named and served as defendants.37
When an action to quiet title is brought by the purchaser of a tax
deed, chapter 10 of the Revenue and Taxation Code provides an alter-
native procedure which goes part way toward meeting the chain of title
problem discussed in the preceding paragraph." Section 3952 permits
an action against the "heirs and devisees" of a claimant of record
known, or believed, to be dead.3" In our hypothetical case, plaintiff's
suit would lie against the heirs and devisees, not only by name, but also
as "the heirs and devisees of John Jones." Consequently, all papers in
the action-the complaint, the summons, the lis pendens, and the judg-
ment-will state the name of the deceased claimant of record, thus
providing an orderly chain of record title. A judgment would con-
clusively determine whether the persons served as heirs and devisees had
any claim to title. It may be questioned, however, whether the judg-
ment conclusively establishes that the persons so served were the only
heirs and devisees. Of course, the practical problem of identifying,
locating and serving heirs is not alleviated.
If the plaintiff, on the other hand, has not acquired title by tax
deed, he cannot avail himself of chapter 10 of the Revenue and Taxa-
tion Code. Can he obtain the same advantages by bringing an ordinary
class action under section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, naming
as defendant the class "all heirs and devisees of John Jones"? If two
37. Cf. Audrain, Title Insurance of Oil and Gas Leases, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 523,
525 (1956).
38. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 3950-72.
A similar procedure is used in a general quiet title action in Nebraska. See
NEn. REv. STAT. § 25-526 (1943); Finnegan, Problems and Procedures in Quiet Title
Actions, 26 NEB. L. Rav. 485, 507-10 (1947).
39. CAL. R V. & TAX. CODE § 3952 provides: "The complaint may further include
as defendants persons unknown to plaintiff who claim any right, interest, lien or claim
on the land or cloud upon the title of plaintiff thereto arising to the date of the deed
from the State. In any case in which any person who appears to have had an interest
in said land or any claim or cloud upon the title of plaintiff thereto is known to be
dead, the heirs and devisees of such person may be sued as 'the heirs and devisees'
of said person naming him or if such person is believed to be dead and such belief is
alleged in the complaint on information and belief then the heirs and devisees of such
person may also be sued as 'the- heirs and devisees' of said person, naming .him,
provided that such person is also named as a defendant."
On the operation of this section see OGDEN, supra note 21, at 850. There appear
to be no reported cases construing this section.
or three heirs of Jones were to bring a class action as plaintiffs, on
behalf of the heirs and devisees of Jones, their action might fail because
each individual's claim would require litigation of separate fact and law
issues. In Gerhard v. Stephens,40 the court held a class action inappro-
priate where "each alleged member of the class would be required to
establish his individual deraignment of title"-language fully applicable
to our hypothetical case-and where affirmative defenses might create
factual disputes as to each member's claim.4' Although actions against
a class of defendants are rarer and close precedents are lacking,42 the
principles would not seem to differ. Perhaps the plaintiff might be
able to limit his pleadings to those issues common to all members of
the defendant class. However, even if the plaintiff does no more than
plead adverse possession, there always remains the possibility that the
limitation period is tolled as to some members of the class, but not
others.
43
A class action, in any case, will not give our plaintiff benefits
equivalent to chapter 10 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. Under
the procedure provided in chapter 10, the plaintiff must use due dili-
gence to locate and serve heirs,44 but if the search proves unsuccessful,
he is permitted to serve the class by publication. Under section 382 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, however, it would appear that the plaintiff
is saddled with the additional requirement of serving at least one mem-
ber of the class, who can then defend as the representative of the class
interest.45
Action Against Administrator Ad Litem
If the plaintiff elects to arrange the appointment of an adminis-
trator, instead of proceeding against the heirs directly, the difficulties
are ethical rather than practical. The decedent's estate presumably will
consist solely of a claim to the realty in question-all other assets having
40. 68 Cal. 2d 864, 442 P.2d 692, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1968).
41. Id. at 912, 442 P.2d at 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 648; see 2 LoYoLA L. REv. 152
(1969); 21 STAN. L. REv. 1227 (1969).
42. Most have been actions against members of religious bodies or similar un-
incorporated associations. See, e.g., Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Fellowship
Nonsectarian Church, 39 Cal. 2d 121, 245 P.2d 481 (1952); Wheelock v. First
Presbyterian Church, 119 Cal. 477, 51 P. 841 (1897).
43. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
44. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 3960.
45. CAL. CODE CIrv. PROC. § 382 reads in part: "[WIhen the question is one
of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous,
and it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court, one or more may sue or
defend for the benefit of all."
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long since been distributed-which is barred by the plaintiff's adverse
possession. As a result, the decedent's estate is valueless and the legal
compensation provided in Probate Code section 901 will not be ade-
quate to compensate the administrator for his services. 46  The plaintiff
must either pay the administrator or hire an attorney to perform the
work of administration behind the facade of the normal administrator;
in either case, conflict of interest problems begin to appear.
What are the duties of the administrator? Statutory requirements
notwithstanding, it would be pointless for him to publish notice to
creditors47 or to seek recovery of long-since-distributed assets.48 More
to the point, what are his duties with respect to the quiet title action?
49
Should he put the plaintiff to his proof in the hope that with effective
objections to evidence and rigorous cross-examination, the plaintiff will
fail to prove some element of adverse possession? By merely filing an
answer, the administrator may force the plaintiff to place the case on
the trial calendar rather than the default calendar, and thereby delay
the hearing several months. The administrator, in short, can be a con-
siderable nuisance and a possible danger-should he use this leverage
to induce the plaintiff to "buy" the decedent's claim?
If the plaintiff arranges the appointment of the administrator be-
fore he files the quiet title action, the administrator can utilize the pro-
cedure provided in Probate Code sections 851.5 and 852. Section
851.5 states in part that "[i]f a person dies in possession of, or holding
title to, real or personal property which, or some interest in which, is
claimed to belong to another, the executor or administrator may file
with the clerk of the court a verified petition setting forth the facts upon
which the claim is predicated." Hearing and notice are provided for,
"and, if the court is satisfied that the conveyance or transfer should be
made, it shall make an order authorizing and directing the executor
or administrator to execute the same to the party entitled thereto
. . . .,0 This procedure cannot be used "if objection thereto is made,
or if a civil action is then pending, or if the court determines the matter
46. The administrator receives 7 per cent of the first thousand dollars, and lesser
percentages of additional assets. CAL. PROB. CODE § 901. Defense of a quiet title
action is an extraordinary service entitling the administrator to additional fees under
CAL. PROB. CODE § 902, but if the estate has no assets there is no fund from which the
administrator can draw his fees, ordinary or extraordinary.
47. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 700.
48. See id. § 571.
49. The administrator, of course, has a duty to defend the estate against adverse
claims to estate property. See Estate of Hart, 51 Cal. 2d 819, 337 P.2d 73 (1959).
50. CAL. PROB. CODE § 852.
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should be determined by civil action."'" This proviso creates problems
whenever the decedent is one of many defendants, since the plaintiff is
forced to delay service upon the other defendants and publication while
he is setting up administration for the deceased claimant. Furthermore,
there will be cases where a claimant's death occurs, or is first discov-
ered by the plaintiff, after the civil action has been filed.
Ogden, in California Real Property, describes the normal title
company recommendation that the administrator file an answer and put
plaintiff to his proof, but cooperate in expediting trial and waiving post-
trial rights. 2  Although the administrator, by answering, has com-
pelled a hearing on the merits, Ogden does not suggest that the admin-
istrator should investigate, construct, and present a case for the de-
fendant.
The administrator who follows Ogden's recommendation will pro-
tect the quiet title plaintiff, whose judgment is secure so long as there
was a hearing on the merits and the plaintiff himself did not participate
in fraud.53 Since the plaintiff is protected, his title insurer is protected.
However, whether the administrator is free from liability is another
question.54 The cases clearly hold that an administrator who is aware
51. Id.
52. Ogden reports: "When inquiry is made as to the rule of title practice
when suing a representative (e.g., in an action by a tax title holder to quiet title
against a representative of the estate of a deceased record owner), the answer of most
title insurers is this: The representative should file an answer denying the allegations
of the complaint, thus placing the plaintiff upon proof; he should not disclaim or
stipulate that judgment be taken against him, unless duly authorized to do so by order
of the probate court; but he may stipulate as to procedural matters, such as hearing
the matter on the short cause calendar, or he may, after judgment, waive his rights
to appeal or to move for a new trial. This, it will be recognized is a conservative rule
of practice which is calculated to assure that the judgment will not be subject to
attack on the ground that the representative wrongfully permitted it to be taken against
him. Exceptions to the rule might be made where justified; for instance, a judgment
by default might be considered valid where the time to apply for relief under C.C.P.
473 had expired, at least where the interest of the plaintiff had passed to an innocent
purchaser." OGDEN, supra note 21, at 880-81.
53. See Merrill v. Bachelder, 123 Cal. 674, 56 P. 618 (1899); Hollyfield v.
Geibel, 20 Cal. App. 2d 142, 148, 66 P.2d 755, 758 (1937); cf. Newport v. Superior
Court, 192 Cal. 92, 230 P. 168 (1922). A judgment based upon a stipulation by the
administrator going to the merits, or upon default, would be on shaky ground. See
Jordan v. Clausen, 13 Cal. App. 2d 16, 20, 56 P.2d 240, 242 (1936); Fickes v.
Baker, 36 Cal. App. 129, 171 P. 819 (1918). A settlement, with court approval
should be safe if the court examined the merits of the action and the plaintiff did not
participate in fraud. See Merrill v. Bachelder, supra.
54. The administrator may submit his proposed course of action for judicial
scrutiny in several ways. He can petition for instructions, CAL. PROD. CODE § 588,
for approval of a compromise, id. § 718.5, or for directions to convey under Probate
Code sections 851.5 and 852. See text accompanying note 50 supra. Whether
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of a defense to a quiet title action, and fails to present it, is liable to the
heirs.s5 At the same time, they leave open two questions that should
be of concern to any prospective administrator: (1) Does the adminis-
trator have any duty to use due diligence to discover possible defenses?
(2) Does he have any duty to seek, in good faith, to obtain the best
possible compromise for the estate?56
If the former obligation is imposed, the prudent administrator
should interview heirs and witnesses, obtain a title report, and seriously
consider deposing the plaintiff. If the latter obligation is imposed, the
administrator who sits by while the plaintiff proves a minimum case,
but who could have settled out of court for $200 or $300, is liable to
the heirs. Impose both requirements and the administrator is a true
adversary, representing the rights of the heirs as vigorously as would
any independent administrator; however, the imposition of both re-
quirements has made the action to quiet title inordinately expensive and
somewhat dangerous.
At this point plaintiff's attorney will begin to regret that he ever
heard of Jones. Should he have limited his search to the 20 years
preceding the filing of the complaint, thus remaining ostensibly igno-
rant of Jones' claim? Of course, if the plaintiff were really ignorant of
Jones' claim he would not be suing; it is precisely because of Jones'
record title that the plaintiff needs a quiet title decree. Nevertheless,
is the plaintiff's ostensible ignorance sufficient? This query was an-
swered in Gerhard v. Stephens: "Persons who appear of record at any
time to have some claim to the property are 'known' persons and
plaintiff must use reasonable diligence to discover their identity.
'57
Perhaps the attorney should have limited his search to the Book of
Deeds, and eschewed the inquiries in the probate records and the de-
judicial approval is complete protection is questionable but it should be effective
against all heirs notified of the proceeding. The practical problem is that unless the
court will act on presentation by affidavit, the plaintiff may have to prove his case
twice-once in the probate court of the county of administration to support the peti-
tion for instructions, and once in the superior court of the county of the quiet title
action.
55. Estate of Auslender, 53 Cal. 2d 615, 349 P.2d 537, 2 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1960); Estate of McSweeney, 123 Cal. App. 2d 787, 792, 268 P.2d 107, 112 (1954).
56. In the case of Estate of Pillsbury, 175 Cal. 454, 166 P. 11 (1917), a doctor
was-sued for malpractice and the matter was tried, resulting in a verdict against the
doctor for $9,018.32. Two days later he died. Judgment was entered, and the
administrator did not appeal or seek a compromise. The court, noting that no showing
was made that an appeal would succeed, stated that "we are cited to no law, and
know of none, which makes it the duty of any trustee to seek to compel a creditor to
accept less than his just demand." Id. at 464, 166 P. at 15.
57. 68 Cal. 2d at 904, 442 P.2d at 726, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 646 (emphasis added).
partment of vital statistics that led to his discovery of Jones' death.
This, arguably, would leave Jones as a known defendant of unknown
residence, who could be lawfully served by publication in the county
where the land is located. Can the plaintiff avoid the whole problem
by proceeding in wilful ignorance of Jones' death? The code imposes
an explicit requirement of due diligence to locate only those defendants
whose claims arose within 20 years of the filing of the action, or 10
years if the plaintiff is using the alternative period in section 749.1.1
The statutory formula to reach that result is complicated. Under sec-
tion 749, a quiet title action is deemed to be brought as an action
against a known claimant under section 73859 if the defendants ac-
quired their claim within the preceding 20 years; section 749.1 makes
the same provision for claims acquired within 10 years.60 Section 750
of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that for any defendant sued
under section 738, service by publication must be made pursuant to an
order given under section 415.50 of that code, which requires an
affidavit of due diligence.6' The necessary implication is that claims
not acquired within 20 or 10 years preceding the action are not deemed
brought under section 738. As to such defendants, if their whereabouts
are unknown, section 750 merely requires that the plaintiff file an affi-
davit stating, among other things, "the names of the defendants not
served whose place of residence is unknown to the plaintiff." Upon the
filing of the affidavit, the court is required to make an order for service
of publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where
the land is located. The requirements of the section 750 affidavit are
specific and do not include a showing of diligent search to locate known
defendants of unknown residence.
Although this particular argument was not raised in Gerhard v.
Stephens, the thrust and language of that opinion indicate that the
argument is foredoomed to failure. The defendants in that case had
failed to either name or serve, in any fashion, the successors of a claim-
ant of record. The court, however, indicated that merely naming the
58. See note 6 supra.
59. See note 3 supra.
60. See note 6 supra.
61. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 750 states in part: "In the event that service of
any summons shall be required to be by publication as to any defendant, including a
defendant as to whom the action is brought under the provisions of Section 738, the
order for such publication, made pursuant to the provisions of Section 415.50 may be
made either as a part of the order for publication of summons made as to unknown
defendants, or as a separate order, as the court or a judge thereof may consider proper
in the particular case." Although this language will not become operative until July
1, 1970, the present language of section 750 is to the same effect.
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successors and giving service by publication would not have been suffi-
cient; "to meet the standard of reasonable diligence they were obligated
to undertake some effort to locate the stockholders or their heirs."62
I do not quarrel with the standard of reasonable diligence imposed
by Gerhard v. Stephens. This standard is essential to prevent the de-
liberate shaping of quiet title actions in a fashion designed to deny a
hearing to holders of outstanding claims.63 However, in closing the
loopholes in the statutory language, Gerhard has made imperative the
enactment of a legislative solution to facilitate quieting title against de-
ceased claimants of record.
As a practical matter, there are cases where it is easier to serve the
heirs, and cases where it is easier to arrange administration. In cases
of the former type, the plaintiff's dilemma is resolved most easily by
giving Revenue and Taxation Code chapter 10 general applicability to
all quiet title actions. The heir who is not served should be treated
simply as we now treat any "person unknown who may claim an in-
terest"-such a person can void the judgment as it pertains to him if
he can prove that the plaintiff failed to use due diligence to locate and
serve him, and that the property has not passed into the hands of a bona
fide purchaser.64
For those cases best handled by the appointment of an adminis-
trator, I propose the creation of a new legal person-an administrator
ad litem.65 He would not have the obligations of a general adminis-
trator, such as notice to creditors, tax returns and appraisals, etc.; his
rights and duties would be limited to the title controversy. Ogden's
recommendations might well serve as a starting point. While the ad-
ministrator should not default or stipulate to the merits, he should co-
operate fully with the procedural expedition of the action. 66 The ad-
ministrator ad litem, chosen and paid by the plaintiff, should not under-
take an active defense nor press settlement demands on behalf of heirs
who may not care. If an active defense is in order, it should be fi-
62. 68 Cal. 2d at 909-10, 442 P.2d at 726, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
63. This standard may also be essential to constitutional due process. See
OGDEN, supra note 21, at 864; cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950).
64. Compare Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 909-10, 442 P.2d 692, 726
69 Cal. Rptr. 612, 646 (1968) (judgment void where plaintiffs failed to use due
diligence to serve claimants), with Garrison v. Blanchard, 127 Cal. App. 616, 622, 16
P.2d 273, 275 (1932) (bona fide purchaser prevails even though 'claimant dead at
time of quiet title action and affidavit of personal service was fraudulent).
65. Compare the proposal for a quasi-guardian ad litem to represent all persons
served by publication in Quiet Title, supra note 1, at 1303-04.
66. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
nanced by the heirs and conducted by an administrator of their choos-
ing. Thus, one additional duty should be impressed upon the adminis-
trator ad litem-the requirement that he use due diligence in locating
and notifying the heirs of the quiet title action. A practical limit, how-
ever, has to be put on the time and money expended in performing this
duty. I would think in most cases, 60 days and $300 (or one percent
of the value of the land, if greater) would be a reasonable maximum.
Upon locating an heir and explaining the action, the administrator
ad litem, should notify the heir in writing (1) that the administrator
does not intend to undertake an active defense nor to seek a favorable
settlement; (2) that the heir may petition for a substitute administrator
ad litem, for the replacement of the administrator ad litem by a general
administrator, or for leave to intervene in the quiet title action; and (3)
that the administrator will not oppose any such petition. Thus, any
heir who desires and can finance an active defense, may assume control
of the action.
Finally, the statute should make it clear that a plaintiff may select
and pay the administrator ad litem, and that such conduct does not
constitute fraud on either of their parts, nor breach of fiduciary duty or
unlawful conflict of interest on the part of the administrator.
In Rem Action Based On Record Title
Although the common law gave various remedies to an owner
claiming under a conveyance, it afforded no remedy by which an ad-
verse possessor could establish his title. In what appears to be an
overcorrection of this lacuna, the legislature created an in rem quiet title
action for the adverse possessor, but left the record owner with only an
in personam action. This anomaly in the statutes has been explored in
detail in another article,6 7 which recommends legislative authorization
of an in rem action based upon a showing of record title.
Upon further thought, a possible justification for the present statu-
tory distinction appears. In all but a few rare situations (discussed in
part one of this article), proof of adverse possession for the 5 years
preceding the action will prove good title against all persons, including
owners of record. Proof of perfect record title, on the other hand, does
not achieve this end, for it does not preclude the risk that title was lost
through adverse possession.
Nevertheless, an in rem action based on record title could serve
several useful purposes. First, a record owner of unused land may be
67. 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 608 (1965).
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able to prove that no one has possessed the land adversely to his claim,
even though he cannot affirmatively prove adverse possession on his
own behalf because of noncompliance with Code of Civil Procedure
sections 323 or 325,11 or inability to prove payment of taxes. Second,
and more important, there are situations in which adverse possession of
the particular interest clouding the title is either impractical or impos-
sible. One example is a plaintiff who seeks a judicial determination
that restrictions on the use of his land are invalid.69 Since adverse
possession would require him to risk open and notorious violation of
the restrictions, his only remedies are a section 738 action or a declara-
tory relief action, neither of which binds unknown claimants. Another
example is that of a plaintiff seeking to clear severed mineral rights.
70
How far back must a plaintiff trace a perfect record title in order
to prove a cause of action under our proposed legislation? I suggest
the plaintiff be allowed to specify the operative date in his complaint.
If he can show perfect record title from 1910, he so pleads and proves
and should receive a decree quieting title against any claims of record
arising after 1910. If in addition he proves that no one has possessed
adversely to the record title since 1910, his decree will quiet title against
all claims arising after that date. If he can trace his title to Adam, so
be it. The principle is simple: Plaintiff is entitled to a decree quieting
title against all claims, and only those claims, whose invalidity he can
demonstrate.
Action to Cancel Unexploited Severed Mineral Interests
In California, it is common practice for grantors to retain an inter-
est in mineral rights, even where there is no reasonably foreseeable
possibility that such rights will be exploited. The bare possibility of a
bonanza is there, and if the particular grantee is satisfied with surface
rights, the grantor will retain a mineral interest. However, when it
later becomes necessary or economically desirable to put together a full
and unencumbered fee title, identifying and locating the owners of the
retained mineral interest may be a difficult task.71 Negotiating for its
68. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 323 sets out the sufficiency of possession, use or
inclosure for the purpose of constituting adverse possession. Section 324 provides
that where possession is under a claim of title not founded upon some writing, only the
land actually occupied is deemed held adversely.
69. See 38 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 608, 608-09 (1965).
70. See text accompanying notes 73-77 infra.
71. See 1 H. WmLIrms & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW 105 (1965) (hereinafter
cited as WmLrAMs & MEYERS]; L. SiMms & C. TAYLOR, THE IMPROvM~ENT OF CON-
VEYANCING BY LEaISLAON 241 (1960); DuPuy, Clouds on Title, 18 TnxAs B.J.
purchase is often difficult, since the value of the mineral interest as an
impairment of the fee title may exceed its intrinsic value as a source of
possible future income from mineral exploitation.72
Where the mineral interests are owned in fee, quiet title actions
are generally ineffective to clear title, since normal surface use is not
hostile to severed mineral rights and therefore does not constitute ad-
verse possession."s In theory at least, if the surface owner exploits the
mineral rights for the statutory period, he should acquire title by adverse
possession.74 Courts of other jurisdictions disagree, however, whether
exploitation at one site confers prescriptive title to the entire tract,75 and
whether exploitation of particular kinds of minerals gives title to other
unexploited minerals7 6 -although it is obviously impractical for the
surface owner to exploit all possible minerals at all possible sites
throughout the property. In Gerhard v. Stephens, the California Su-
preme Court raised the question of constructive adverse possession of
minerals, cited the authorities pro and con from other states, and moved
on without resolving the controversy. 77  The practical consequence for
clearing of titles is plain: An attorney can hardly advise his client to
drill several unproductive oil wells or open an unprofitable quarry so
that, after five years, the client can litigate unsettled questions of law.
Gerhard v. Stephens did, however, raise the possibility that title
could be cleared by obtaining a judicial determination that the mineral
owner has abandoned his interest. The court held that an estate in
"fugacious minerals" is a profit a prendre, 71 an incorporeal heredita-
ment, which can be terminated by abandonment. 79  "Fugacious"
275 (1955) [hereinafter cited as DuPuy]; Webster, The Quest for Clear Land Titles,
44 N.C.L. REV. 89, 95-96 (1965); 21 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1232-33 (1969).
72. See Dupuy, supra note 71, at 276.
73. See Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 898-99, 442 P.2d 692, 719, 69
Cal. Rptr. 612, 639 (1968); Stoebuck, Adverse Possession of Servable Minerals, 68
W. VA. L. REV. 274, 279-80 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Stoebuck]. See generally
1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 71, at § 224.1.
74. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 10.7 (A.J. Casner ed.
1952); 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 71, at § 224.4; Stoebuck, supra note 73,
at 282-91.
75. See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 71, at § 224.4 nn.12-13 & cases
cited therein; Stoebuck, supra note 73, at 284-85 & cases cited therein.
76. See generally Stoebuck, supra note 73, at 286-87.
77. 68 Cal. 2d at 900-01, 442 P.2d at 720, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
78. Id. at 878-80, 442 P.2d at 705-07, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26. For analysis
of this holding see 2 LOYOLA L. REV. 52, 55-56 (1968); 21 STAN. L. REV. 1227,
1228-30 (1969). On the possible classifications of oil and gas interests and their
various legal consequences see 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 71, at § 209.
79. 68 Cal. 2d at 882-83, 442 P.2d at 707-08, Cal. Rptr. at 627-28; see I
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 71, at § 210.1.
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means "wandering"; it refers to oil and gas, not to such hydrocarbons
as asphalt, nor to ores, rocks, gravels, and other solid minerals.80 The
implication of the court's language, therefore is that estates in nonfuga-
cious minerals are corporeal hereditaments and cannot be terminated
by abandonment. 81 Such a distinction raises problems in construing
conveyances which the Gerhard court barely began to face. In Ger-
hard, the conveyances were of "all petroleum, coal oil, naptha, asphalt,
maltha, brea, bitumen, natural gas and other kindred or similar sub-
stances and deposits and rock, gravels or other formations containing
or yielding any of said substances." '82 Asphalt, at least, was nonfuga-
cious.83 Did the grantee acquire a fee interest in asphalt but a profit a
prendre in oil and gas? The court found that the grantors "did not
intend to convey two different types of estates in the same instrument"8
and that "they were primarily concerned with transfering the oil and
gas rights.""5  Thus the conveyance of the asphalt was "incidental,"
and the grantees' estate in all hydrocarbons was held to be a profit a
prendre.
How would the court treat a conveyance of "all oil, gas hydrocar-
bons and other minerals on or under the described lands"? 87  A con-
veyance of "all mineral rights"?88 Apparently in each case, the courts
80. Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 897-98; 442; P.2d 704, 718, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 624, 638 (1968).
81. 21 STAN. L. REv. 1221, 1234-35 (1969). Gerhard v. Stephens cited Callahan
v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d 788 (1935), as establishing the distinction between
fugacious and nonfugacious minerals, and as rejecting the position that a severed
interest in fugacious minerals is a defeasible fee. 68 Cal. 2d at 878, 442 P.2d at
704, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 624. Severed rights in nonfugacious minerals, however, can be
held in fee. See Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d 788 (1935); Nevada Irriga-
tion Dist. v. Keystone Copper Corp., 224 Cal. App. 2d 523, 36 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1964).
A fee interest in the substratum is, under the common law, a corporeal hereditament.
See Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 898, 442 P.2d 692, 718, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612,
638 (1968). It cannot be abandoned. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 71, at 101.
82. 68 Cal. 2d at 873 n.4, 442 P.2d at 701 n.4, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 621 n.4.
83. Id. at 893 n.39, 442 P.2d at 718 n.39, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 638 n.39.
84. Id. at 898, 442 P.2d at 718, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 638. This conclusion
is criticized in 2 LoYoLA L. Rav. 152, 157 (1969).
85. 68 Cal. 2d at 898, 442 P.2d at 719, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
86. Id.
87. This was the form of conveyance in Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., 125
Cal. App. 2d 222, 270 P.2d 604 (1954).
88. See Maxwell, A Primer of Mineral and Royalty Conveyancing, 3 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 449, 451 (1956), which states that "tilt seems clear that a conveyance in terms
of 'all minerals' would, in the absence of limiting language, pass oil and gas in
California but there has been no substantial litigation on this phase of the interpretation
of oil and gas conveyances in this state." See also 1 Wr LiAMS & MEYERS, supra
note 71, at 242-66.
must first determine, as a question of fact, whether the parties intended
to create one estate or two different estates. Should the former be the
case, the court must next decide as a question of fact whether the
parties were "primarily" concerned with fugacious or nonfugacious min-
erals. If their primary concern was with fugacious minerals, all min-
eral interests would be treated as profits a prendre, which can be aban-
doned; if concerned with nonfugacious minerals, the estate in fugacious
minerals would, at most, be all that could be abandoned.
Abandonment, moreover, requires both nonuser and an intent to
abandon. 9  In Gerhard, the court held that 47 years of nonuser,
coupled with such a number of cotenancy interests that a court ap-
pointed receiver would be needed for development, was not sufficient
to show abandonment." It is, therefore, safe to conclude that aban-
donment is not often a useful device for clearing title.
A deed may also retain mineral interests for a term of years.
Typical language will except and reserve to the grantor all interests in
minerals on or below the surface for a period of 20 years and so long
thereafter as minerals are extracted in paying quantities. In Victory
Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co.,9 this apparently innocent clause collided
with the Rule Against Perpetuities. The interest of the grantee in the
mineral rights (arising after the grantor's term) was held to be invalid
as violating the Rule Against Perpetuities. The grantee argued that
the grantor's interest was not an exception but "a reservation of a profit
a prendre" and that therefore, the grantee held a fee interest not subject
to the Rule.92 The trial court, however, found it to be an exception,
and the court of appeal agreed. Consequently, the grantee's interest
was categorized as a contingent mineral interest that would not neces-
sarily vest within 21 years and that was therefore invalid. The court
further indicated that even if the deed were construed to create a reser-
vation rather than an exception, the grantee's interest would still be in
violation of the Rule.93 This was dictum, however, and directly con-
trary to the common law.94 This issue was raised in Brown v. Terra
89. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 159, at 806-07 (A.J. Casner
ed. 1952).
90. 68 Cal. 2d at 893-95, 442 P.2d at 716-17, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
91. 125 Cal. App. 2d 222, 270 P.2d 604 (1954). For discussion and analysis of
this case see Jones, The Rule Against Perpetuities As It Affects California Oil and
Gas Interests, 7 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 261, 265-69 (1960); Simes, Perpetuities in California
Since 1951, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 247, 263-64 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Simes].
92. 125 Cal. App. 2d at 231-32, 270 P.2d at 611.
93. 125 Cal. App. 2d at 233, 270 P.2d at 611-12.
94. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.24 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); Simes,
supra note 91, at 264-65.
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Bella Irrigation District,95 but the court specifically reached no decision
touching it.9 Gerhard v. Stephens, by reaffirming that an estate in oil is
a profit a prendre,97 which arguably cannot take effect as an exception
under the common law,98 will encourage relitigation of the exception
versus reservation problem.
The Victory Oil decision appears to have reached most undesirable
results. 99 First, the obvious intent of the parties to the transaction
was frustrated. Second, the decision transformed a limited term in-
terest in mineral rights into a perpetual one. This perpetual separa-
tion of fee ownership from mineral ownership is a greater barrier
to free alienability of property than is any uncertainty relative to the
date on which the grantee's interest will vest.100 Finally, a grantor una-
ware of the Victory Oil decision will normally assume that his interest
terminated when minerals were not discovered within the 20 year pe-
riod. Consequently, on the death of the grantor, his estate will not list
the mineral interest as an asset and will not file a decree of distribution
in the county in which the property is located. When the sale or mort-
gage of the property is subsequently considered, it may therefore be
impossible to determine who owns the mineral interest.
The 1963 amendments to the California Rule Against Perpetuities
may or may not solve the problem, but they certainly confuse the issue.
Section 715.5 of the Civil Code permits an interest void under the Rule
to be reformed to validate that interest, 101 but there appear to be no
cases indicating in what manner the courts are likely to use this section.
Section 715.8 redefines "vested interest" favorably enough to solve the
Victory Oil problem, 0 2 but it validates with such sweeping and indis-
95. 51 Cal. 2d 33, 330 P.2d 775 (1958). For discussions of this case, see 11
HASTINGS L.J. 197 (1959); 58 MicH. L REv. 285 (1959).
96. 51 Cal. 2d at 36, 330 P.2d at 777.
97. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
98. 2 WiLLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 71, at 180-81.
99. For discussion of the title insurance problems and uncertainties created by
Victory Oil see Audrain, Title Insurance of Oil and Gas Leases, 3 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv.
523, 534-36 (1956).
100. See 2 WmuAMs & MEYERS, supra note 71, at 182, 58 MicH. L. R v. 285,
288 (1959); cf. J. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETITIES § 279 (4th ed. 1942).
101. CAL. CIM. CODE § 715.5 provides: "No interest in real or personal property
is either void or voidable as in violation of Section 715.2 of this code if and to the
extent that it can be reformed or construed within the limits of that section to give
effect to the general intent of the creator of the interest whenever that general
intent can be ascertained. This section shall be liberally construed and applied to
validate such interest to the fullest extent consistent with such ascertained intent."
102. CAL. CIv. CODE § 715.8 provides: "An interest in real or personal property,
legal or equitable, is vested if and when there is a person in being who could convey
or there are persons in being, irrespective of the nature of their respective interests,
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criminate force that it cannot be relied upon and may be unconstitu-
tional. 10 3 Article 20, section 9 of the California Constitution declares
that "[n]o perpetuities shall be allowed except for eleemosynary pur-
poses." Two court of appeal decisions have held that this provision, in
effect, enacted the John Chipman Gray Rule Against Perpetuities in
haec verba. 10 4  I am not in sympathy with any construction of article
20, section 9 so narrow that the legislature would have to go to the
voters to solve the problem of the unborn widow' 05 and similar such
curiosities. Nevertheless, it appears that the legislature has gone be-
yond defining and modifying the Rule Against Perpetuities and has, in
effect, repealed it and permitted those future interest monstrosities the
common law and article 20, section 9 sought to avoid. A look at the
types of interests validated under a literal construction of the language
of Civil Code section 715.8106 certainly suggests that this section has gone
beyond constitutional bounds.
The application of the 1963 legislation to conveyances made prior
to its enactment is equally confused. Section 8 of the 1963 act provided
that "this Act does not invalidate or modify the terms of any interests
who together could convey a fee simple title thereto.
"An interest is not invalid, either in whole or in part, merely because the duration
of the interest may exceed the time within which future interests in property must vest
under this title, if the interest must vest, if at all, within such time."
103. CALIFORNIA WILL DRAFTING § 15.6 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1965);
Dukeminier, Perpetuities Revision in California: Perpetual Trusts Permitted, 55 CALIF.
L. REV. 678, 682-83 (1967); Simes, supra note 91, at 261, 266; Note, California
Revises the Rule Against Perpetuities-Again, 16 STAN. L. REV. 181-82 (1963).
104. Estate of Sahlender, 89 Cal. App. 2d 329, 346, 201 P.2d 69, 79 (1948);
Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 545, 114 P.2d 646, 648-49 (1941).
105. The "unborn widow" problem arises in the case of a devise such as "to A for
life, then to A's surviving widow, then to A's surviving children." The remainder
to the children may violate the rule against perpetuities. The reasoning is that the
widow may conceivably be a person not yet born at the testator's death; consequently
the only available measuring life is A's and if the widow survives A by more than 21
years the remainder will not vest within the lives in being plus 21 years. See Leach,
Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638, 644 (1938).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.7 was enacted to "solve" the "unborn widow" problem.
See Simes, supra note 91, at 256. CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.7 provides: "In determining
the validity of a future interest in real or personal property pursuant to Section 715.2
of this code, an individual described as the spouse of a person in being at the com-
mencement of a perpetuities period shall be deemed a "life in being" at such time
whether or not the individual so described was then in being."
106. Section 715.8 would appear to validate such limitations as "to B corporation,
as long as it does X volume of business per year, and when it ceases to do X volume of
business, to C and his heirs; Blackacre to the grantor's last surviving grandchild; or
Blackacre to Y charity in fee simple, but if the land should ever cease to be used as an
orphanage, then to C and his heirs in fee simple." Note, California Revises the Rule
Against Perpetuities-Again, 16 STAN. L. REv. 177, 181-82 (1963).
[Vol. 21THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
March 1970] IMPROVING CALIFORNIA'S QUIET TITLE LAWS 859
which would have been valid prior to its enactment, and any such inter-
est which would have been valid prior to the effective date of this Act
is valid irrespective of the provisions of this Act." Our concern, how-
ever, is not about the invalidating of a previously valid interest, but the
validating of a previously invalid interest. Is the reversionary interest
of the grantor, which arises only because the grantee's interest violates
the Rule against Perpetuities, an "interest" protected under section 8 of
the act?
Perhaps some day the California courts will overrule Victory Oil.107
Pending that blessed event, corrective legislation is in order. The spe-
cific holding of Victory Oil could be reversed by the enactment of a
narrowly drawn statute excluding from the prescription of the Rule in-
terests in a grantee which arise or vest upon termination of an excepted
or reserved profit a prendre. Such an enactment, in effect, would
simply correct the erroneous interpretation of the common law made
in Victory Oil, and adopt the argument of the grantee in that case. I
would prefer, however, a broader statute. A statute that depends upon
the classification of interests into. profits a prendre and fee interests
leads to the fugacious-nonfugacious minerals dichotomy of Gerhard
v. Stephens and to the construction problems mentioned earlier. 0 8 An
exception in the grantor of all interests in minerals on or below the sur-
face for a period of 20 years and so long thereafter as minerals are ex-
tracted in paying quantities (in essence, the language of the Victory Oil
deed) would still involve the Rule Against Perpetuities as to nonfuga-
cious minerals. Therefore, any legislation on this subject should en-
compass all mineral interests even though in its application to nonfuga-
cious minerals it may not conform to the common law classifications of
interests.
Several states have passed laws terminating undeveloped mineral
interests after 20-50 years of nonuser. 0 9 Such legislation, in my view,
107. Wong v. DiGrazia, 60 Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d 817, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1963),
held that "a document should be interpreted if feasible to avoid the conclusion that it
violates the rule against perpetuities." Id. at 539-40, 386 P.2d at 827, 35 Cal. Rptr.
at 251. This plainly was not the approach of the Victory Oil court; that decision seems
typical instead of the rigid and remorseless applications of the rule condemned in
Wong. See 60 Cal. 2d at 533-34, 386 P.2d at 823, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
108. See text accompanying notes 80-88 supra.
109. Ten states have marketable title acts which, under various conditions, may
clear titles of claims not recorded within the preceding 20 to 50 years (depending
upon the particular statute). ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 12.1 (Smith-Hurd 1966);
Ihm. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-1101 to -1110 (Bums Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE §§ 614.17-.20
(Supp. 1969); Mcrc. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§ 565.101-.109 (1967); MAINN. STAT. §
541.023 (Supp. 1969); NEB. RPv. STAT. §§ 76.288-.298 (1966); N.D. CNT. CODE
should meet the following criteria: (1) Interests should be terminated
after no more than 20 years of nonuser. Thirty to fifty years is too long
a period to tie up land, and increases the problem of locating the owners
of the dormant interest. (2) The statute should apply to all mineral
interests, not just oil and gas interests. (3) The statute should apply
to royalty interests, and make clear that a dormant royalty interest
terminates in favor of the mineral interest owner. The action to termi-
nate the mineral interest could be brought under Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 738, as an in rem action under sections 749 or 749.1, or
under the proposed legislation permitting an in rem action based on
record title. Regardless of the form of action, the plaintiff would have
to prove the nonuser.
Some state laws provide that rerecording, although without any
effort to develop the mineral interests, tolls the statutory period. 110 This
provision seems doubtful, since it permits the inactive owner to hold
out for nuisance money indefinitely. However, unusual economic
conditions or policy considerations may make "storage" of mineral dis-
coveries in situ for extended periods desirable. An obvious example is
gold; many valuable mines have been shut down indefinitely due to
government policy fixing the price of gold. Also, there may be a grow-
ing tendency for conservation organizations or subdividers to acquire
mineral rights with the objective of ensuring that such rights will not be
exploited. An attempt to distinguish such owners from the owner
seeking a pay-off for a worthless title might turn on questions of motive
and good faith; if this is undesirable in land title litigation, where cer-
tainty and predictability are important, it might be better to permit re-
newal of interests by rerecording.
Conclusion
I have attempted in this article to point out some of the anomalies
§ 47-19A-01 to -11 (1960); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.47-.56 (Page Supp.
1968); S.D. CoMP. LAws § 43.29-1 to -10 (1967); Wis. STAT. § 893.15 (1966).
Three states have statutes specifically intended to clear off dormant mineral estates.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 541.291-.294 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-704
(Supp. 1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-154 to -155 (1969). For a comparative analysis
of the various laws see Smith, Methods for Facilitating the Development of Oil and
Gas Lands Burdened with Outstanding Mineral Interests, 43 TEXAs L. REv. 129,
150-66 (1964).
None of the various laws are fully satisfactory in view of the criteria presented in
the text.
110. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1104 (Burns Supp. 1969); MicH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 554.291-.293 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. 541.023 (Supp. 1969); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 76.290 (1966); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.51 (Page Supp. 1968); Wis.
STAT. § 893.15 (1966).
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and inefficiencies in the California quiet title laws. The last amend-
ment to these statutes was in 1949, and the entire statutory scheme for
the clearing of land titles has never been reviewed and revised as a
whole. The waste and frustration caused by inefficiencies in the law
are individual and local, and cannot be presented to the legislature as
an imperative social problem; on the other hand, the remedies needed
are relatively simple, not subject to political controversy, and would be
a real practical benefit to the landowner and attorneys practicing in this
field.
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